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I. Introduction 
 
The purpose of this paper is to investigate how the “one China” concept of the 
Republic of China (ROC) evolved during the process of Taiwanese democratization 
from the middle of the 1980s to the 1990s.  Ever since 1949, the ROC has in theory 
sought to realize a “one China” situation by recovering mainland China from the 
People’s Republic of China (PRC) and reunifying all of the mainland under the 
government of the ROC.  For its part, the PRC maintains that “the Government of the 
People’s Republic of China is the sole legal government of China, and Taiwan is a part 
of China.”1 
In this article, I will examine how Taiwan’s position on the “one China” issue 
has progressed by examining related official documents and speeches concerning the 
democratization of Taiwan, especially under the leadership of former President Lee 
Teng-hui.  The question I address here is whether there was a crucial evolution of the 
“one China” concept immediately after Lee took over the reins of government.  I will 
also investigate how this evolving “one China” view may be affected by the coming to 
power of the new president of Taiwan, Chen Shui-bian.  By employing these 
approaches, the paper aims to clarify Taiwan’s attitude toward the realization of 
reunification under the concept of “one China”.   
 
II. Differences between the ROC and the PRC over the “One China” Concept 
 
After 1949, the Chiang Kai-shek administration sought to recover mainland 
China and thereby establish “one China” through reunification under the government 
of the ROC.2  This political goal was in principle inherited by the son of Chiang 
Kai-shek and later president Chiang Ching-kuo, while leaving open the question as to 
how seriously Taiwan’s leaders took the goal of reunification. 
                                            
1 Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Jimmy Carter, bk. 2, GPO, 1979, pp. 
2264-66. 
2 Donald J. Senese and Diane D. Pikcunas, Can the Two Chinas Become One? (Washington, 
D.C.: The Council for Social and Economic Studies, 1989), p.193. 
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By contrast, the PRC has taken the position that there is only “one China,” 
which is the People’s Republic of China.  For the PRC, the “liberation of Taiwan” 
was a crucial political goal after its establishment in 1949.  When diplomatic 
relations between the United States and the PRC were normalized in 1979, the PRC, 
under the leadership of Deng Xiao-ping, revised its policy towards Taiwan and altered 
the political slogan symbolizing its Taiwan policy from “liberation” to “unification.”  
Moreover, the PRC decided to stop its bombardment targeted at the off-shore islands 
in the Taiwan Strait, which had continued since the Taiwan Strait Crisis of 1958, and 
called for cross-strait contact and dialogue for purposes of reunification.  On 
January1, 1979, the PRC issued a statement, “PRC’s New Year’s Message to 
Compatriots in Taiwan,” which contained the following:- 
 
Unification of China now fits in with the direction of popular 
feeling and the general trend of development.  The world in general 
recognizes only one China, with the Government of the People’s Republic of 
China as the sole legal government. 
      …The Chinese Government has ordered the People’s Liberation 
Army [PLA] to stop the bombardment of Quemoy and other islands as of today.  
A state of military confrontation between the two sides still exists along the 
Taiwan Strait.  This can only create artificial tension.  We hold that first of 
all this military confrontation should be ended through discussion between the 
Government of the People’s Republic of China and the Taiwan authorities so 
as to create the necessary prerequisites and a secure environment for the two 
sides to make contacts and exchanges in whatever field…3 
 
As far as “one China” is concerned, the PRC declared in its message, 
 
We place great hopes on the 17 million people on Taiwan and also 
                                            
3 “Text of NPC Standing Committee Message to Taiwan Compatriots,” New China News Agency, 
December 31, 1978, in FBIS, January 2, 1979. 
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on the Taiwan authorities.  The Taiwan authorities have always taken a firm 
stand on one China and have opposed an independent Taiwan.  This is our 
common stand and the basis for our cooperation.4 
 
As the PRC pointed out in this message, “the Taiwan authorities have always taken a 
firm stand on one China,” so in purely logical terms, the PRC and the ROC shared a 
common position at that time.  Of course, the “one China” concepts that they held 
differed diametrically.  As discussed in the following section, this gap between the 
PRC and ROC over the “one China” concept has widened further during the 
democratization process in Taiwan.   
 
III. Evolution of the “One China” Concept under the Lee Administration 
 
1. President Lee’s Efforts transcending the “Political Fiction” of the ROC’s Sovereignty 
 
In January 1988, following the death of Chiang Ching-kuo, vice president Lee 
Teng-hui was inaugurated as president of Taiwan.  Although Lee was a successor of 
the Chiangs, he was not related to them by blood.  He was in fact the first native 
“Taiwanese” (as opposed to “mainlander”) to become the president of his country.  
Immediately after his inauguration, he faced a political conflict with the conservatives 
in the Kuomintang (KMT) who had served Madame Soong Mayling and others.5  
These conservatives sought to prevent President Lee from becoming the Chairman of 
the KMT.  However, Lee managed to survive the incident and assumed the KMT 
chairmanship.6 
                                            
4 New China News Agency, in FBIS, ibid. 
5 Soong Mayling is also known as Madame Chiang Kai-shek; she held a number of political and 
extra political positions and had considerable political influence in the KMT government, both 
during her husband’s life and after.  In 1988, after the death of her son, President Chiang 
Ching-kuo, she sided with those who sought to prevent Lee Teng-hui from gaining leadership of 
the KMT. 
6 Later, in 1993, a faction of conservatives in the KMT left the party and formed the New Party. 
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On July 7, 1988, the KMT opened its 13th Party Congress, at which Lee 
Teng-hui was elected to the post of party chairman.  The new Party platform, which 
would provide the government’s policy guidelines for the next four years, emphasized 
the continuation of the democratization and liberation processes in the realms of 
politics and the economy.  These guidelines included the KMT’s policy toward the 
PRC.7 The KMT declared its intention to continue its “Three No’s Policy”8 (no 
contact, no negotiation, and no compromise) toward the PRC and to promote the 
“reunification of China” in line with its traditional official ideology, the “Three 
People’s Principles.” Written by Sun Yat-sen,9 these comprised the protection of 
nationalism, democracy, and the livelihood of the people.  Of course, under the 
authoritarian system of the KMT, democracy in Taiwanese society was still limited 
and the principles were only nominal.  
The reason why there was nothing special in Taiwan’s policy toward the PRC 
as articulated in the guidelines of the new administration was that Lee Teng-hui’s 
political power was not yet established within the KMT.  Considering in particular 
the strength of the conservatives in the KMT, attachment to the ROC’s traditional 
policy was crucial for him at the start of his new administration..  Later, as an 
extension of this conventional position, “Taiwan’s Guidelines for National 
Unification” were adopted by the National Unification Council on February 23, 1991, 
and by the Executive Yuan (the cabinet) on March 14, 1991.  The guidelines stated:- 
 
[The aim of unification is] to establish a democratic, free, and 
equitably prosperous China. …It should be achieved in gradual phases under 
the principles of reason, peace, parity and reciprocity. …[ In the short term, ] 
to enhance understanding through exchanges between the two sides of the 
                                            
7 “Quanhui Tongguo Xianduanjie Daluzhengce” (KMT Congress Adapts New “Platform”), 
Zhongyangribao, July 13, 1988. 
8 The policy of no contact, no negotiation, no compromise, was enunciated by Chiang Ching-kuo 
at the 12th KMT Party Congress in 1981 in response to “PRC’s New Year’s Message to 
Compatriots in Taiwan” by the PRC. 
9 Sun Yat-sen is known as the father of the Republic of China and the founder of the KMT. 
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Strait and eliminate hostility through reciprocity. 10 
 
 “Unification” was emphasized in these guidelines so as to placate 
conservatives who were suspicious of the constitutional governmental reforms that 
were being introduced under the leadership of President Lee.  Conservatives in the 
KMT were anxious lest that the hidden motive underlying Lee’s reforms was 
promotion of the independence of Taiwan.  Therefore, the new administration had to 
officially confirm that it had no intention of declaring the independence of Taiwan and 
that it would continue to seek the unification of China.  As far as the “one China” 
concept is concerned, these guidelines asserted the principle of “one China” and 
declared that the mainland and Taiwan belong to “China.”  However, this definition 
of “one China” was controversial at that time, as it remained unclear whether “one 
China” meant “the Republic of China,” or “a new China” following the reunification 
of the ROC and the PRC.  
Meanwhile, the Lee administration gradually began to change its actual 
interpretation of the phrase “one China.”  The first indication that President Lee 
intended to alter the government’s direction came in his speech at the Second Plenum 
of the 13th KMT Central Committee on June 3, 1989.  At the opening ceremony, 
President Lee stated, “We should seek ‘one China’ and hope for the reunification of 
China.  However, today, we have to recognize that the ROC’s sovereignty is limited 
temporarily.”11  Although he gave no exact definition of “one China” in this speech, 
President Lee was probably trying to say that people in Taiwan at the very least should 
look at the reality that the ROC’ s sovereignty no longer extended over mainland 
China. 
                                            
10 Text published in: Mainland Affairs Council, Executive Yuan, Republic of China, “Consensus 
Formed at the National Development Conference on Cross-Strait Relations,” February 1997. 
11 As to the Chinese version, see “Lee Zhuxi Zai Er Zhong Quanhui Yanzheng Xuanya”(Lee 
Teng-hui seeking to build unified China and freedom of democracy), Zhongyangribao, July 3, 
1989.  According to the Japanese translation, the word “temporarily” was supposedly used by 
Lee. However, this word cannot be found in the Chinese version. For the Japanese version, see 
Chukashuho, Vol.1428. 
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When the constitution of the Republic of China was promulgated on January 1, 
1947, the ROC defined mainland China as comprising thirty-five provinces.  In fact, 
after Chiang Kai-shek fled to Taiwan in 1949, the ROC’s actual sovereignty extended 
only to Taiwan province and a part of Fujian province.  However, the ROC kept alive 
the political fiction that the ROC’s sovereignty embraced mainland China.  It appears 
that the Lee administration gradually tried to go beyond this entrenched “political 
fiction” of the ROC’s sovereignty. 
 
2. Terminating the “Temporary Provision” and the Meaning of “One China” 
 
On May 1, 1991, the Lee administration declared its intention to terminate the 
“Period of National Mobilization for Suppression of the Communist Rebellion”, 
commonly known as the “Temporary Provisions”, which had been promulgated by the 
KMT government on May 10, 1948, during the Chinese Civil War.  This termination 
of the Temporary Provisions signified a change in the ROC’s attitude toward the 
PRC.12  By terminating the provisions, the ROC ceased to regard rule by the PRC as 
a “Communist Rebellion,” the term that was officially announced at the end of civil 
war against the Chinese Communists, and recognized the political authority of the 
PRC in mainland China.  The ROC’s acknowledgement of the PRC as a political 
entity whose sovereignty covered mainland China indirectly implied that the ROC 
itself was a viable political entity that ruled only Taiwan and some other islands as 
well.  
The Temporary Provisions were symbolic of the earlier authoritarian character 
of the KMT, and by upholding them, the president was justified in exercising absolute 
political power beyond the ROC constitution.  The Temporary Provisions expanded 
the emergency powers given to the president in Articles 39 and 43 of the constitution, 
permitted the president to exceed the constitutionally limited two terms in office, and 
authorized the president to appoint members to the three elected bodies of the 
government.  However, critics of the Temporary Provisions had long considered 
                                            
12 John W. Garver, Face off: China, the United States, and Taiwan’s Democratization (University 
of Washington Press, 1997), p.27. 
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them overdue for repeal and saw them as an obstruction to constitutionalism and 
democracy. 
In a series of constitutional governmental reforms, and by abolishing the 
Temporary Provisions, the Lee administration tried to put an end to pervasive 
authoritarianism and aimed to reinforce the cabinet system in the ROC.  Originally, 
the conservatives within the KMT were sceptical of Lee’s reforms.  However, since 
they preferred Lee Teng-hui to be less powerful as a president, they therefore 
supported the abolition of the Temporary Provisions. 
The abolition of the Temporary Provisions also implied reform of the National 
Assembly whose roles were regulated by the provisions.  Historically, the National 
Assembly’s representation had been based on the claim that the ROC government 
represented “all of China” and the Assembly contained representatives who had 
remained members from the 1947 election onwards.  The termination of the 
Temporary Provisions meant that these “perpetual” representatives, elected from the 
provinces of mainland China, could be retired, and new members to the National 
Assembly reelected.  Except for those from Taiwan province, virtually all of those 
representatives of the National Assembly who represented “all of China,”, were ousted 
from the National Assembly.   
On August 1, 1992, the Mainland Affairs Council of the Executive Yuan 
officially announced the definition of “one China” in a text entitled “Taiwan on the 
Meaning of ‘One China.’” This states: 
 
Both sides of the Taiwan Strait agree that there is only one China.  
However, the two sides of the Strait have different opinions as to the meaning 
of “one China.”  To Peking, “one China” means the “People’s Republic of 
China (PRC),” with Taiwan to become a “Special Administration Region” after 
unification.  Taipei, on the other hand, considers “one China” to mean the 
Republic of China (ROC), founded in 1911 and with de jure sovereignty over 
all of China.  The ROC, however, currently has jurisdiction only over Taiwan, 
the Pescadores, Kinmen, and Matsu.  Taiwan is part of China, and the 
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Chinese mainland is part of China as well.13 
 
This announcement could be viewed as the culmination of the events that resulted 
from the termination of the Temporary Provisions that had governed the “one China” 
issue.  The definition recognized the PRC’s jurisdiction over mainland China and the 
ROC’s jurisdiction over Taiwan, the Pescadores, Kinmen, and Matsu.  Later, in 
December 1998, the Taiwan Provincial Government, which had been named one of the 
provincial governments in addition to the thirty-five provinces of mainland China, 
was eradicated as part of an administrative reform, and its governor, James Soong, 
resigned. This event was widely seen as not much more than a political conflict within 
the KMT between President Lee and Governor James Soong over the issue of the 
abolition of the Taiwan Provincial Government. However, it can also be regarded as 
part of a sequence of events leading to the change of the “one China” concept in 
Taiwan. 
The new “one China” definition is based on two subtle assumptions. First, the 
PRC and the ROC are different political entities, and “Taiwan is part of China, and the 
Chinese mainland is part of China as well.” Second, there is no “one China” in 
existence now, and the ROC seeks reunification for “one China.”  The “one China” 
that the ROC seeks is neither the “one Republic of China” nor the “one People’s 
Republic of China.”  The “one China” could be called an “unknown China,” as 
President Lee later mentioned that “there is no ‘one China’ now.”14 
 
VI. Conclusion 
 
1. Evolution of the “One China” Concept in Taiwan 
                                            
13 “Consensus Formed at the National Development Conference on Cross-Strait Relations,” 
op.cit.,.  “Taiwan on the Meaning of ‘One China’” was adopted by the National Unification 
Council. 
14 Lee Teng-hui, “U.S. Can’t Ignore Taiwan,” Wall Street Journal, August 3, 1998. Lee made this 
statement immediately after President Clinton’s announcement on the “Three No’s” on June 30, 
1998. 
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During the Chiang Kai-shek administration, reunification of China, that is, the 
realization of “one China” by the Republic of China, was the fundamental political 
goal of the Chinese nationalist administration in Taiwan.  The ROC’s position is that 
it represents China, and that Taiwan is a part of China.  Meanwhile for its part, the 
PRC holds the view that there is only “one China” in the world, and that is the 
People’s Republic of China. 
  Immediately after normalization of relations with the United States, the 
PRC announced that “the Taiwan authorities have always taken a firm stand on one 
China and have opposed an independent Taiwan.”  Of course, while the PRC and the 
ROC could at least share a common concept, both sides tacitly understood that each 
held a distinct concept of “one China.”  However, as democratization in Taiwan 
made progress toward the end of the 1980s, the implications of “one China” for 
Taiwan gradually changed.  This changing of the “one China” concept in Taiwan was 
not induced by external factors, such as a threat from the PRC, but rather came mainly 
from internal factors brought about by the changing political situation within Taiwan. 
Immediately after his inauguration as president in 1988, Lee Teng-hui 
appeared to support the ROC’s traditional “one China” line that “one China” would 
mean the reunification of all of mainland China and Taiwan under the government of 
the ROC.  At that time, Lee did not make drastic changes in the “one China” policy 
probably because his political power was not yet properly established.  However, in 
the process of democratization in the early 1990s, the Lee administration gradually 
sought to go beyond the “political fiction” that the territory legitimately ruled by the 
ROC consisted of the whole of mainland China as well as Taiwan. 
As discussed above, the 1992 document, “Taiwan on the Meaning of ‘One 
China,’” shows that the ROC still considers “one China” to mean the Republic of 
China, founded in 1911 and with sovereignty over all of China including mainland 
China, Taiwan and the other islands.  The ROC has never officially changed its 
position regarding this definition of “one China.”  However, the implications of “one 
China” for the ROC have in fact changed because of internal factors and the events 
that occurred in the early 1990s. 
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2. Implications for Today’s Taiwan’s Position of “One China” 
 
On May 20, 2000, Chen Shui-bian, who was a leader of the opposition party, 
the Democratic Progress Party (DPP), was inaugurated as the tenth president of the 
Republic of China.  The KMT had been in office for over a half century – in other 
words for the entire period since the ROC government under Chiang Kai-shek fled to 
Taiwan following its defeat by Communist China on the mainland in 1949.  However, 
as a result of Chen’s electoral victory in 2000, KMT rule came to an end and the DPP 
took over the reins of government. 
In his inauguration speech of May 20, 2000, President Chen stated, “We 
believe that the leaders on both sides possess enough wisdom and creativity to jointly 
deal with the question of a future ‘one China.’”15  Although President Chen has never 
provided an official interpretation of the expression “a future ‘one China’ ” used in his 
speech, “a future ‘one China’ ” mans an “unknown China.” 
This change in the “one China” concept caused the ROC’s policy toward the 
PRC to change as well.16  On November 26, 2000, the new Chen administration 
proposed that the ROC and the PRC should follow an agreement reached in the 
autumn of 1992, between the Taiwan Strait Exchange Foundation (SEF: the ROC side) 
and the Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Strait (ARATS: the PRC side). 
On November 3, 1992, the SEF sent a letter to the ARATS, formally proposing that 
each side should make respective statements through verbal announcements.  The 
ARATS fully respected and accepted the SEF’s suggestion:-17   
                                            
15 Zhongyangribao, May 21, 2000. 
16 Asahi Shinbun, Tokyo, November 30, 2000. 
17 Renmin Ribao (People’s Daily), Beijing, November 6, 1992.  Also, at a press conference on 
October 18, after Politburo Member and Vice Premier Qian Qichen met with visiting SEF 
Chairman Koo Chen-fu, Tang Shubei, the ARATS executive vice chairman, cited the letter sent 
from ARATS to SEF on Novemver 16, 1992.  Tang repeated what ARATS said: “Both sides of 
the strait stick to the ‘one China’ principle and will strive to pursue national unification.  
However, negotiations on routine matters across the strait do not involve the political meaning of 
one China.” Xinhua Hong Kong Service, October 18, 1998, translated in FBIS.  
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The PRC has agreed to a Taipei proposal that both sides “orally 
state” their respective “one China” positions. …Though both sides of the 
Taiwan Strait insist on the “one China” principle in the process of joining 
efforts to pursue national unification, they have a different recognition about 
the contents of “one China.”…18   
 
However, this flexible interpretation toward “one China” by the PRC did not last long, 
for changes in the PRC’s attitude in the autumn of 1992 signified another political 
purpose: the PRC strongly hoped to realize the first China-Taiwan dialogue which was 
scheduled in the summer of 1993.   
In recent years, the conceptual gap over “one China” between the PRC and 
ROC has widened.  On November 30, 2000, the PRC officially announced a rejection 
of the agreement made in 1992.  While the ROC’s concept of “one China,” and even 
its policy toward the PRC changed, the PRC has persistently asserted the realization 
of “one China” by its government.  
The evolution of the “one China” concept in Taiwan creates a real possibility 
that the “status quo”  sought by the ROC in the Taiwan Strait both during and after 
the Cold War might be destroyed.19  The “status quo” that the ROC seeks is neither 
reunification with the PRC nor de jure independence from China.20 However, any 
further evolution of the “one China” concept will surely make the “status quo” of 
Taiwan untenable, in that it would induce Taiwan to seek de jure instead of de facto 
independence.   
Evolution of the “one China” concept may possibly incur some type of 
conflict between the PRC and the ROC, and it will certainly threaten stability in the 
Asia-Pacific region.  To prevent such a conflict in the Taiwan Strait, the international 
                                            
18 “Straits Group Agrees to State Positions ‘Orally’,” Central News Agency, Taipei, November 18, 
1992, in FBIS. 
19 Haruka Matsumoto, “Analysis of Current Taiwan Affairs,” Asia Pacific Security, The Japan 
Institute of International Affairs, March 1999, p.59. 
20 “Beijing’s ‘one-China’ dogma haunts Chen, Daily Yomiuri, December 4, 2000. 
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community must persuade the ROC not to go beyond the “status quo” and to stay 
within a framework of de facto independence.  At the same time, both the PRC and 
the ROC should be urged to have an open conduit of communication for productive 
talks on the reunification of China, even though China and Taiwan are pursuing quite 
different objectives when it comes to the realization of “one China”.  
 15
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Books 
Chao, Linda and Myers, Ramon H. Democracy’s New Leaders in the Republic of 
China on Taiwan. Stanford: Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace, 
Stanford University, 1997. 
Garver, John W. Face off: China, the United States, and Taiwan’s Democratization 
(University of Washington Press, 1997) 
Feigenbaum, Evan A. Change in Taiwan and Potential Adversity in the Strait.  
Gong, Gerrit W. Taiwan Strait Dilemmas: China-Taiwan-U.S. Policies in the New 
Century. Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 
2000. Santa Monica: RAND, National Defense Research Institute, 1995. 
Huang, Chun-Chieh and Tsao, Feng-fu. ed. Postwar Taiwan in Historical Perspective. 
Maryland: University Press of Maryland, 1998. 
Hickey, Dennis Van Vranken. Taiwan’s Security in the Changing International System. 
Boulder, Colorado: Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data, 1997. 
Lasater, Martin. ed. The Two Chinas: A Contemporary View. Washington, D.C.: The 
Heritage Foundation, 1986.  
Lee, Bernice. The Security Implications of the New Taiwan, Adelphi Paper 331. New 
York: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1999.  
Lee, Teng-hui. The Road to Democracy: Taiwan’s Pursuit of Identity. New York: Dell 
Publishing Co., 1999. 
Senese, Donald J. and Pikcunas, Diane D. Can the Two Chinas Become One? 
Washington, D.C.: The Council for Social and Economic Studies, 1989. 
Wachman, Alan M. Taiwan: National Identity and Democratization. New York, 
London and England: M.E. Sharpe, 1994. 
 
Articles 
Lee, Teng-hui, “Understanding Taiwan: Bridging the Perception Gap,” Foreign Affairs, 
Volume 78, No.6, November/ December 1999. 
Lee, Teng-hui, “U.S. Can’t Ignore Taiwan,” Wall Street Journal, August 3, 1998. 
 
